support for the theory that the resource advantage is present in litigation.
Surprisingly, previous studies of PCT have not yet considered what happens when governments face off against one another in the course of litigation. Since conflict between levels of governments is endemic to federal systems, the government with the most resources may be able to use the litigation process to tilt the "rules of the game" to their advantage. Using party capability theory to explore and assess the success of each level of government in litigation may yield important insights into the dispute dynamics of governments in federal systems. To make such an evaluation, the decisions of three high courts, the United States, Canada, and Australia, are used to construct net advantage scores in litigation for each level of government as individual parties and head-to-head conflicts.
The descriptive results, though descriptive and qualified, are broadly consistent with party capability theory. The implications of the analyses for the application of party capability theory to the study of federal systems are further discussed in the conclusion.
Federalism and conflict
Federalism is a system of governance where there are multiple levels of government each with constitutionally grounded claims to some degree of organizational autonomy and jurisdictional authority (Halberstam 2008: 142) . Whether conceived of as a "constitutional bargain" or as a "creative commitment," federalism enables inter-jurisdictional cooperation by placing limits on governments through the distribution of constitutional powers (Halberstam 2008: 143) . Though perhaps counterintuitive, federal systems are not static structures but are dynamic and evolving entities that can pragmatically adapt to changing circumstances (Watts 1998: 128) . This flexibility facilitates cooperation amongst units of government; however, competition between federal and state authority is also a characteristic of these systems as well (Dye 1990; Kenyon and Kincaid 1991) . Since some constitutions are quite specific in the policy-making responsibilities of constituent government and some are not, the court system often becomes cluttered with cases that seek to clarify the lines of authority within certain policy areas (Tully as quoted in Schertzer 2016). 
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Scholars like Watts, Elazar, and Zimmerman among others have characterized federal systems in two main ways: horizontal and vertical, whereby horizontal federalism as a style is concerned with the intergovernmental relationships between sub-national units that, constitutionally, can express their desires to reflect regional differences, and vertical federalism is concerned with how the national and sub-national units related to each other.
Federal systems, under their constitutional arrangements, are challenged by both types of relationships (Elazar 1987; Watts 2000; Zimmerman 2011) . Federal systems, like the United States, Canada, and Australia, are emblematic of this type inter-jurisdictional competition (Breton 1996; Halberstam and Hills 2001) created by central and constituent state governments. These systems are characterized by independent political units of government sitting alongside one another, but with a full complement of powers including an independent democratic base, an independent fiscal base and the ability to formulate, execute and adjudicate its policies (Halberstam 2008: 145) . The potential for conflict between governments balancing the demands of shared rule is thus inherent in the very design of such federal systems. The importance of creating safety valves to manage conflict is therefore of the utmost importance.
Most federations rely on the courts as a primary safety valve to resolve a conflict.
I
Courts fulfill the primary adjudicating role in the interpretation of the national constitution or the "rules of the game" and adapt the constitution to changing circumstances through the decision-making process (Duchacek 1970: 188-275; Watts 1998: 126) . The courts protect the constitutional bargain by enforcing the boundaries of power against encroachment as each level of government seeks to expand their authority at the expense of another. This phenomenon has led scholars to refer to courts, such as the United States Supreme Court, as the "umpire of the federal system" (Braden 1942; Field 1934; Freund 1954; Lenaerts 1990 ). More explicitly, courts are responsible for "enforcing the legal and constitutional rules governing the mechanics of federalism-the rules governing the position in a federal system which the states occupy, or which the national government occupies (Field 1934: 233) .
There is wide disagreement about the court's role as umpire of a federal system with some arguing that it is needless, ineffective or even potentially destructive (Wechsler 1954; Choper 1980; Tushnet 1999: 123) . Wechsler's (1954) classic argument against judicial involvement is that there are already sufficient political safeguards in place that are inherent E -18 in federal systems. Others maintain that the central judiciary is not independent enough to serve as an impartial umpire in disputes (e.g. Casper 1976; Dahl 1957) . This argument follows from the central government's role in creating the central judiciary, supplying financial resources, and controlling appointments render the central judiciary a natural ally of the central government (Halberstam 2008: 147) . Bzdera (1993) argues that there is a tendency for nationally appointed federal courts to use the power of judicial review to augment the powers of the national government at the expense of constituent sub-national units. Bzdera (1993: 28) goes on to suggest that there is a "failure of judicial review in the modern federal state" and that federal courts are complicit with the national government in "the exercise of centralized political control of member states." Federal systems, especially horizontal types, deliberately create an institutional arrangement that generates competition and conflict between levels of government. The commonly devised solution for positively managing these institutional skirmishes is for the courts to serve as impartial umpires that patrol the boundaries of federal power as each level of government seeks to guard and enlarge their authority at the expense of the others.
The project of shared governance through federalism depends on the fair and efficient resolution of disputes by the courts. Gaining a greater understanding of and identifying potential biases in the decision-making process is of great importance. Galanter's (1974) classic framework for why the law favors the more powerful -the "haves" -as opposed to the less powerful -the "have nots" -depends on the former's ability to draw from and access resources advantageous to litigation. These resources include developing or securing experienced legal talent and specialists, relationships with institutions and established reputations (Galanter 1974: 98-99) . Access to these resources skews the probability of litigation success, winning, towards those parties that develop and deploy them regularly -the haves -because the haves long-run interests coincide with developing rules that advantage their ability to absorb some losses while maximizing gains (e.g. a minimax strategy) over the long term (Galanter 1974: 100) . It is this type of litigant that Galanter refers to as a "repeat player" because they play for rules, not just a single, particular outcome (1974: 100). These repeat players share the litigation field with havenots or "one-shotters" who use the courts rarely, more often than not have a claim that outpaces their abilities and resources, and are singularly focused on winning (Galanter 1974: 97-98) . It is unsurprising then that when repeat players and one-shotters collide in litigation, the outcome usually favors the repeat players because the rules will reflect the interests or preferences of the group that has been cultivating them -the repeat players (Galanter 1974: 119-124) .
Party capability theory
A host of studies have evaluated Galanter's general thesis -that more advantaged parties will be advantaged in litigation -in a variety of settings in the United States ( Conflicts that are high stakes, between governments, for instance, are unlikely to be conflicts over who gets what, but likely to be value differences over whom is right (Galanter 1974: 111) and will require the intervention of a court as opposed to a settlement.
Federal systems are the most likely environments to observe types of government in regular conflict attempting to resolution through litigation. Conventional wisdom suggests that central or national governments will routinely win litigation contests between subnational or local governments because of their primacy in the constitutional order and the inherent bias that exists in the national courts against other levels of government (Bzdera 1993; Casper 1976; Dahl 1957; Shapiro 1964) . However, if the courts must maintain and enforce a constitution that disperses power among the levels of government, then there may be instances where lower levels of government prevail over national or central governments. To determine which governments come out ahead, cases involving each level of government in the United States, Canada, and Australia must be explored and examined.
Case selection
Canada, Australia, and the United States are three federal systems under examination for this analysis. Each has its traditions regarding how much, or little power is explicitly granted within their respective national constitutions, as well as their judicial traditions that may affect interpretations of inter and intra-state powers within each state. In Canada, constitutional development can largely be described in three phases: British rule, Canadian "independence," and the post-Charter era. Originally, Canada had significant ties to Great Britain, its mother country and was considered a colony under British rule until 1931 (although the process of complete legal dependence wasn't fully completed until 1982).
Like, Great Britain, Canada was founded with a strong parliamentary system, and the British framers of the first "constitution" in Canada, wrote the British North American Act of 1867 with a special eye towards avoiding the conflicts seen in the United States over issues of state's rights and federal supremacy over the issues of slavery. Unlike the United States at its creation, Canada's courts were subordinate to the British crown, and inter- 
E -23
The United States is commonly referred to as the first modern federation. At its founding, the framers of the constitution codified within the document the concept of enumerated powers. Thus, the American national government, unlike its state subunits, is one of specifically granted and limited powers. Unlike, Australia and Canada, the United States has separate executive and legislative branches of national government; the judiciary is independent as well. Further, the United States never had a judicial system that was subordinate regarding decision-making to another country. The practice of judicial review 
Data and measures
The data is drawn from the High Courts Judicial Database, which includes decisions by by siding with the respondent; appellants tend to prevail at a higher rate than respondents.
Importantly, the measure of net advantage takes into account the differences between success rates as an appellant as opposed to a respondent and therefore provides a better indication of a given party's advantage in litigation. Table 1 includes the number of cases, the success rate as appellant, respondent, overall (appellant and respondent) and the overall measure of net advantage by country and type of government. It is instructive to note the difference in the number of cases that each level of government has been involved. In both the United States (3083 cases) and Canada (1363 cases Party capability theory suggests that there is a rank ordering between types of government based on the respective ability of each level of government to access resources that are critical for successful litigation. The implication is that the net advantage will be highest for national governments, followed by subnational governments and then local governments. The net advantage column in Table 1 
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To fully assess whether a particular type of government has an advantage in litigation, the net advantage of governments in head-to-head match-ups are evaluated.
Which governments come out ahead?
The descriptive results of comparisons of net advantage for each type of government against the others are reported in Table 2. The table provides To begin, the head-to-head comparisons of national governments in the United States, 
Conclusion
This article has sought to investigate whether party capability theory can provide useful purchase in understanding the dynamics of federalism in the United States, Canada, and Australia. All three countries are examples of federal systems where the likelihood of conflict between levels of government is built into the institutional frameworks. In these systems, courts play the crucial role of serving as a venue for dispute resolution but also function as an independent arbiter or umpire of the boundaries of power. Scholars have acknowledged the concern that national courts may be biased for the national government when clashing with subnational or local governments over issues that implicate the limits on power in federal systems (Bzdera 1993; Dahl 1957; Wechsler 1954) E -30 expectations subnational and local governments in Australia do not benefit from the expected resource advantage. In the head-to-head match-ups between governments, the subnational governments in Canada performed at a higher net advantage that would be expected theoretically. Also, local governments exhibited a higher net advantage against national governments in the United States and Australia, contrary to PCT. These deviations from expectations are, however, entirely consistent with the courts serving as "umpires of federalism." If national governments seek to expand or extend their authority beyond the boundaries of federalism, then the courts should and apparently do decide against them despite their resource advantage.
Despite these notable exceptions, the most striking observation from the descriptive analyses is that national governments are net advantaged against subnational governments in all three countries. The most regular conflicts take place between national and subnational governments and the implications for the balance of power in these three federal systems is important to consider. In the United States (43.00%), Canada (3.85%) and Australia (28.21%), national governments are net advantaged against their subnational counterparts. These results indicate that in conflicts over the boundaries of federalism, over at least a three-decade period, national governments have won an enduring shift in the centralization of power against subnational governments at the expense of shared governance.
The descriptive findings presented and discussed here must be elaborated upon with future research. First, the net advantage scores for each level of government include all legal issue areas, but richer and more complex relationships among governments may emerge when disaggregated into specific issues. Second, a case-by-case analysis may be required to gain leverage over instances where resource advantages have not proven effective. Lastly, it is of crucial importance to understanding the general utility of party capability theory to continue to investigate its applicability in other countries and contexts, especially emerging and consolidating democracies. I Elazar (1993) stresses the existence of a supportive federal political culture characterized by constitutionalism, tolerance and the recognition of distinctive regional groups. II Subnational governments include state, regional, provincial or territorial governments. III Local governments include city or other local governments. IV In Table 2, note that "National v Subnational" and "Subnational v National" is equivalent; any differences are due to rounding errors. V Again, in Table 2 , note that "National v Local" and "Local v National" is equivalent; any differences are due to rounding errors. VI Once again, in Table 2 , note that "Subnational v Local" and "Local v Subnational" is equivalent; any differences are due to rounding errors.
